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Effects of financial distress and financing constraints on trade credit provisions 
Abstract
Purpose
Existing studies that documented the effect of financial distress on trade credit provisions did not 
include measures financial constraint. It is possible that financial distress is tie to financial 
constraints, and both financial distress and financial constraints mutually reinforce each other in 
their effects on trade credit provision. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effects of 
financial constraint and financial distress on trade credit provisions in the UK FTSE 350 listed 
firms.
Design/methodology/approach
This study employs panel data in the estimation of the determinants of accounts payables and 
accounts receivables of the UK FTSE350 firms from 2009 to 2017.
Findings 
This study finds that financial distress has significant positive effect on accounts payables and a 
significant negative effect on accounts receivables. Financial constraints has significant negative 
effect on accounts payables and a significant positive effect on accounts receivables. 
Practical implications
Trade creditor desiring to maintain an enduring product-market relationship grant more 
concessions to customer in financial distress. The amount of trade credit that sellers provide to 
financially constrained firm is an increasing function of the buyer’s creditworthiness. The urgent 
cash needs of financially distressed firms lead them to sell trade receivables to factoring 
company leading to reduction in trade receivables. Firm facing external financing constraints 
increase trade credit to customers in anticipation of cash flow inflow to enhance liquidity.
Originality/value
This study shows that financial distress and financial constraints mutually reinforce each other in 
their effects on trade credit provisions, and firm’s financing condition contributes to divergence 
in trade credit policies. 
Keywords:  Trade credits; accounts payables, accounts receivables, financial distress, financial 
constraints.
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Effects of financial distress and financing constraints on trade credit provisions 
Introduction
Trade credit is a component of working capital that represents the amount collectible by 
suppliers when customers are allowed to delay payment (Ghoul and Zheng, 2016). Despite the 
economic significance of trade credit, it involves high implicit costs in the form of lost cash 
discounts if the customers had made cash payments (Hasan and Habib, 2019). A number of 
studies have found that a host of variables determines trade-credit provisions (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997). Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that firms with sales drop and negative profits 
increase trade receivables to their clients which they attributes to a voluntary attempt to gain 
market share and sales and to an unwanted increase in receivables given the impaired ability of 
troubled firms to enforce the timely collection of their commercial credit. Molina and Preve 
(2012) compare receivables policy of firms facing profitability problems, which they defined as 
the pre-financial distress stage, to receivables policy of firms facing cash flow problems, usually 
in full-blown financial distress. They found that firms facing profitability problems attempt to 
apply aggressive credit policy to clients in order to gain market shares, especially if they have the 
market power to do so without incurring significant sales losses. They also find that firms cut 
their trade receivables in an attempt to get cash when they experience serious cash flow 
problems.
This study extends Molina and Preve (2009, 2012) study and posits that it is possible financial 
distress is tie to financial constraints, and both financial distress and financial constraints 
mutually reinforce each other in their effects on trade credit provision. For example, at the onset 
of financial distress; investors face estimation risk as the future cash flows become more 
uncertain, management reputation suffer, supplier risk the loss of a customer, customers may 
seek other suppliers and lenders are likely to increase the cost of borrowing to combat increasing 
default risk (Whitaker, 1999; Wruck, 1990). Thus, financial distress situation may lead to a 
condition where firm finds it difficult to obtain external finance for profitable projects. The 
inability of the firm to raise external finance and the distress situation may both influence 
company’s trade credit policy.  
Considering the trends in worldwide size of trade credit provisions (Barrot, 2016),  and the 
significant cost implications of the use of trade credits (Hasan and Habib, 2019), understanding 
the relative roles of financial constraints and financial distress in determining whether a company 
provides or receives trade credit is central to corporate finance literature.  The evidence in this 
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study will provide a better understanding to corporate managers, researchers, policymakers, and 
fund providers on the relative importance of financial distress and financial constraints on trade 
credit provisions. In addition to being the first study to examine the relationship between 
financial conditions and trade credit provisions, this study extends the theoretical perspective to 
understand the effect of financial conditions on the provisions of trade credit. 
This study employs panel data in the estimation of the determinants of accounts payables and 
accounts receivables of the UK FTSE350 firms from 2009 to 2017. This study finds that 
financially distressed have a significant positive effect on accounts payables. This result suggests 
that financial distress firm can take advantage of a creditor if it generates a large percentage of 
the creditor’s profit (Wilner, 2000), Trade creditor desiring to maintain an enduring product-
market relationship grant more concessions to a customer in financing distress, while the debtors 
anticipate larger renegotiation concessions, and agrees to pay a higher interest rate to the trade 
creditor. The result further indicates that distress firms are willing to pay the higher interest rate 
on trade credit because associated renegotiations are more likely. Additional analysis indicates 
that financial distress is prevalent among young firms, and that young firms that are financially  
distressed pass on the adverse effect of their distress to suppliers by defaulting on accounts 
payables, leading to an increase in trade payables (Boissay and Gropp, 2007). The result shows a 
significant negative relationship between financial distress and accounts receivables. The 
negative relationship suggests that the urgent cash needs of financially distressed firms, and the 
sale of its trade receivables to a factoring company leads to a significant reduction in trade 
receivables of distressed firms (Molina and Preve, 2009). 
On the other hand, the result further show a significant negative relationship between financial 
constraint and accounts payables. This result indicate that the amount of trade credit that sellers 
provide to the buyer is an increasing function of the buyer’s creditworthiness (Frank and 
Maksimovic, 2004). Since financial constrained firms may have low credit worthy status in the 
financial market, suppliers tend to reduce supply of trade credits to them. The result suggests that 
if a firm face financial constraints, there is an overall reduction in credit received from both the 
financial markets and trade customers, possibly due to concern for creditworthiness of the 
financial constrained firm. Additional analysis shows that financial constraints are prevailent 
among small firms; and since small firms are unlikely to be monitored by rating agencies or the 
financial press, there may be large information asymmetries between these firms and potential 
public investors (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Therefore, suppliers reduce trade credit to small 
firms that are financially constrained.
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The result further shows that financial constraints have a significant positive effect on accounts 
receivables. This results can be explained by the reasoning that firm facing external financing 
constraints or external capital rationing increase supply of trade credit in anticipation of future 
cash flow to finance the profitable projects. The remaining sections of this study are organised as 
follows: Section 2 discusses the conceptual definitions and hypotheses development. Section 3 
discusses the methodology and estimation techniques. Section 4 presents the results of the data 
analysis. Section 5 discusses the implications of the results and offers a recommendation. 
2. Conceptual definitions and empirical hypotheses
The main hypothesis in this study is that trade credit provisions is link to firm’s cash flow, and 
financial distress and financial constraints could influence trade credit policy. This hypothesis is 
based on several streams of the trade credit literature. The first set of theories claims that 
suppliers have an implicit stake in the survival of their clients, implying that they are willing to 
provide financial support to customers in difficulties (Cuñat, 2007; Wilner, 2000). The theory 
suggests that it is profitable for suppliers to lend to customers as long as the discounted value of 
all future rents obtained from continuing the commercial relationship with the client is large 
enough to offset the opportunity cost of financing the loan. Wilner (2000) further argues that a 
firm in distress can take advantage of a creditor if it generates a large percentage of the creditor’s 
profit. The trade creditor desiring to maintain an enduring product-market relationship grant 
more concessions to a customer in financing distress, while debtors anticipating larger 
renegotiation concessions agrees to pay a higher interest rate to trade creditor.
The second set of theories is based on the argument that clients resort to trade credit when there 
is rationing in bank markets (Biais and Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). When 
liquidity is relatively unrestricted, customers prefer to finance themselves through cheaper bank 
debt. However, as liquidity dries up, buyers are rationed by ba ks and they must complement 
their financing with trade credit. In these models, suppliers are able to extend trade credit 
because they have advantage to overcome moral hazard and asymmetric information frictions 
with respect to banks. Moreover, suppliers obtain a mark-up on trade credit over their funding 
costs, which makes the extension of trade credit profitable from the supplier’s perspective. These 
theories have different implications depending on suppliers’ funding position, and in particular, 
on their opportunity cost of funds (Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013).  
2.1. Financial distress and trade payables
Purnanandam (2008) argues that financial distressed firm is more likely to violate debt covenants 
or miss coupon or principal payments without being insolvent. These violations impose 
deadweight losses in the form of financial penalties, accelerated debt-payments, operational 
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inflexibility and managerial time and resources spent on negotiations with the lenders. Despite 
the financial distress conditions, extending trade credit helps to develop long-lasting relations 
with customers; these relations not only ensure continued sales to the buyer but also reduce 
information gathering and evaluation costs (Kennett, 1980). Wilson and Summers (2002) found 
that suppliers are better place to assess buyer risk and have lower collection costs than financial 
institutions. The reputational capital of buyer may also encourage suppliers to extend trade credit 
(Wu et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2014). Suppliers will be willing to extend trade credit to 
financially distressed customers with good reputation. Lee and Stowe (1993) further argue that 
allowing buyers to use a product before paying for it helps reduce the costs of verifying product 
quality. The foregoing discussion suggests that the reputational capital of distressed firms and 
the sellers' desire to develop a long-lasting relationship with distressed firms will lead to an 
increase in trade credit provisions to distressed firms. The above discussions lead to the 
following hypotheses:
H1a: There is a significant positive relationship between financial distress and trade 
payables in the UK FTSE 350 firms.
2.2. Financial distress and trade receivables
Molina and Preve (2009) argue that a firm could enter financial distress because its clients fail to 
pay their bills, or a negative exogenous shock in sales can cause a mechanical drop in the levels 
of trade receivables. This situations can drive the firm into financial distress, and therefore would 
suggest a positive relationship between financial distress and trade receivables. However, 
Meltzer (1960) suggests that the incentive to extend trade credits to clients should decrease 
during the period of high inflation, since the present value of receivables is lower. In additopn, 
Molina and Preve (2009) show that firms have a greater incentive to reduce their trade 
receivables under higher inflation, even if they are not in financial distress, making it more 
difficult to distinguish the effect of financial distress on firm’s trade receivables. Other studies 
demonstrate that in the presence of a clearly exogenous shock generated by a macroeconomic 
crisis in a country, firms decrease their level of trade receivables; and that in the event of a 
country-wide macroeconomic shock, firms first experience an unwanted increase in trade 
receivables, and then react by sharply decreasing their level of trade receivables to their clients 
(Love et al., 2007). 
However, Opler and Titman (1994) found that financial distress firms lose customers, valuable 
suppliers, employees and significant market share to their healthy counterparts. Molina and 
Preve (2009) also argue that  a negative effect of financial distress on trade receivables could be 
due to the urgent cash needs of financially distressed firms. Distressed firms could have a 
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reduced level receivables if the firm sells its trade receivables to a factoring company instead of 
directly reducing its trade receivables. When the distressed firm sells its trade receivables 
through factoring, the firm drops the trade receivables from its balance sheet in exchange for 
cash from the factoring company. If a firm in financial distress sells its trade receivables to a 
factoring company, the effect on its balance sheet and the need for cash is the same as if the firm 
directly cuts its credit to clients. In the end, the relation between financial distress and trade 
receivables will be the same whether the firm uses factoring to collect the receivables faster or 
directly reduces credit to clients. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis
H1b: There is a significant negative relationship between financial distress and trade 
receivables in the UK FTSE 350 firms.
2.3. Financial constraints and trade payables
A firm is financially constrained when the wedge between its internal and external costs of funds 
increases (Kaplan et al., 1997). Financially constrained firms may have to forgo positive NPV 
projects due to costly external financing (Froot et al., 1993). Therefore, the ability of the firm to 
invest in profitable projects in the presence of financial constraints would be sensitive to internal 
cash flow (Kaplan et al., 1997). Frank and Maksimovic (2004) argue that if information 
asymmetries cause banks not to be able to distinguish risky borrowers from safe ones and if 
borrower liability is limited, financially constrained borrowers may be willing to bear the 
ensuing higher interest rates. Therefore, charging higher interest rates does not help banks in 
sorting borrowers, hence, banks resort to credit rationing. 
Prior studies show that trade credit is an important form of alternative financing for firms facing 
financial constraints in the presence of asymmetric information, liquidity shocks or distress risk 
(Chen, Liu, Ma, and Martin, 2017; Cuñat, 2007; Deloof and Jegers, 1999; Molina and Preve, 
2012; Petersen and Rajan, 1995, 1994; Wilner, 2000). In other words, firms lacking suitable 
alternative financing opportunities use trade credit, despite the higher implicit cost associated 
with this form of financing (Ng et al., 1999). Increasing demand for trade credit could result 
from credit rationing (Danielson and Scott, 2004; Howorth and Reber, 2003; Seifert et al., 2013). 
Financial constraints firms might find it more profitable to increase demand for trade credit in 
order to mitigate the costs of borrowing, which may be higher than the discounts received for 
early cash payments (Bougheas et al., 2009; Mateut et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, the redistribution theory of trade credit posits that firms with better access to 
capital will redistribute the credit they receive to less advantaged firms via trade credit (Meltzer, 
1960; Nilsen, 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). The theory argues that suppliers provide liquidity 
to customers experiencing a temporary liquidity shock. Accordingly, when liquidity in the 
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financial market is scarce, cash-rich suppliers face lower opportunity cost of funds and are in a 
better position to provide liquidity insurance through an increased amount of trade credit 
provided to their constrained clients (Cuñat, 2007; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 
2013; Wilner, 2000). Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) find support for the 
redistribution theory of trade credit by showing that firm’s use of trade credit is a function of 
their suppliers’ liquidity, and that the use of trade credit increased the most for clients with more 
liquid suppliers. The forgoing discussions suggests that financial constraints firms might find it 
more profitable to increase demand for trade credit in order to mitigate the costs of borrowing, 
which may be higher than the discounts received for early cash payments (Bougheas et al., 2009; 
Mateut et al., 2015).
However, Frank and Maksimovic (2004) argue that the amount of trade credit that sellers 
provide to the buyer is an increasing function of the buyer’s creditworthiness. Thus, empirically 
less creditworthy buyer gets fewer trade credits overall, since suppliers will be unwilling to sell 
on credit as suppliers tend to mitigate adverse selection. If the inability of financial constrained 
firm to get funds from bank or financial market is due to their low credit worthiness, suppliers 
will reduce trade credits to financial constraints firms. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2a: There is a significant negative relationship between financial constraints and trade 
payables in the UK FTSE 350 firms.
2.4. Financial constraints and trade receivables
The ability of a firm to invest in profitable projects in the presence of financial constraints from 
external sources of funds would be sensitive to internal cash flow (Kaplan et al., 1997). Financial 
constrained firm may increase credit sales to customers in order to increase access to external 
finance since the asset could be used as collateral for loans from financial institutions (Biais and 
Gollier (1997). Financial constrained firms may also find it profitable to increase credit sales to 
customers in order to reduce inventory holding costs, which could be higher than the opportunity 
cost of internal capital and the discounts offered to customers for early cash payments (Bougheas 
et al., 2009; Mateut et al., 2015). Meltzer (1960) suggests that trade credit act as a substitute for 
financial credit during periods of tight monetary policy, leading to an increase in trade credit 
provisions. Furthermore, Molina and Preve (2009, 2012) argue that firms that can exert market 
power are likely to increase trade receivables by reducing the terms of trade receivables without 
paying a large penalty in terms of a sales drop, which ultimately lead to increase cash inflow to 
the firm. The foregoing discussions suggests that financially constrained firms will be willing to 
increase trade credit provisions to customers with a view to collect cash within a short period to 
mitigate the firm’s financial constraint. Financial constrained firm may increase trade credit to 
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customers with the aim of increasing the firm’s total assets, which can be use as collaterals to 
facilitate access to external fund. The foregoing discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H2b: There is a significant positive relationship between financial constraints and trade 
receivables in the UK FTSE 350 firms.
3. Empirical design and data
3.1. Data sources and sample selection
To test the hypotheses, this study generated a stratified, random sample of 250 corporations from 
the FTSE350 listed firms for the period 2009 to 2017. In common with most studies, all financial 
firms, principally insurance companies, and banks are excluded because they have different 
regulatory environments and different reporting conventions compared to other companies. This 
study identifies all companies that were listed on the FTSE350 in the Bloomberg database as of 
May 2018. A backward snowballed approach was used to include all those companies in the 
sample back to the year 2009. This approach is necessary because additions and deletions to 
FTSE firms in the UK follow an automatic rule, which leads on average, to 2 or 3 changes to the 
members of the FTSE350 at each quarterly review (Danbolt et al., 2018). Consequently, the 
sampling method helps to eliminate survival bias. Accounting data were taken from the 
Bloomberg database. 
3.2. Empirical specification 
This study extends the model use in (Atanasova and Wilson, 2003; Deloof and Jegers, 1999) in 
evaluating the determinants of trade credit provisions. The empirical specification for the model 
is stated in equations 1 and 2. 
Model 1
𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ― 1 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡………………………..  (1)
Model 2
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ― 1 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ― 1 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡…………………………..  (2)
This study employs panel data and focuses on the dynamics of a firm’s behaviour on the use and 
provision of trade credits. The firm-specific effect that captures characteristics of the firm which 
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are not observable but have significant impact on the firm’s trade credit provision decisions is 
measured by  .  The time-specific effects that are the same for all firms at a given point in time 𝜑𝑖
but vary through time are measured by . The  is a disturbance term which is assumed to be 𝜖𝑡 𝜇𝑖𝑡
serially uncorrelated with mean zero. 
This study estimates two-way random-effects panel models for the following reasons. First, 
fixed-effects models typically produce biased estimates when the time period is relatively short 
(Chintagunta et al., 1991). Although the time frame for this study is 9 years, some firms 
contribute fewer than 9 observations because of missing data. Second, a limited number of 
periods in which a firm is financially constrained may bias a fixed-effect estimates. Specific tests 
stated in Baltagi and Chang (1994), Greene (2003) and Hsiao (2007) are used to verify if the 
variance components of the disturbance term have fixed effects or random effect. The Durbin-
Watson statistic is used to t st the presence of autocorrelation in the estimates. This study also 
estimates the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each independent variable in the model. Gujarati 
(2004) states a variance inflation factor (VIF) < 10 is the threshold for avoinding the multi-
collinearity problem. 
3.2.1. Dependent variables
Consistent with Atanasova and Wilson (2003), the dependent variable for model 1 is accounts 
payables to lag total assets (APit/TAi,t-1), and the dependent variable for model 2 is accounts 
receivables to lag total assets (ARit/ATi,t-1).  This study chooses these variable rather than 
average day’s payables outstanding or accounts payables to sales (also days sales outstanding for 
model 2), because they are better measures of trade credit as a source of finance for firm’s assets. 
The accounts receivables to lag total assets indicates the ability of firms to enforce timely 
collection of their commercial credit (Molina and Preve, 2009, 2012; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
In the sensitivity analysis, this study uses the ratio of accounts payables to total debt (APit/TDit), 
to total debts captures the substitutability effect of trade credits. That is, whether firm uses trade 
credit as a substitution for external finance. This study also uses the ratio of accounts receivables 
to total sales (ARit/SALESit) in the sensitivity analysis to capture market competition, the 
demand for the company’s products, an attempt to capture more market (Molina and Preve, 
2012; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), and an attempt to reduce inventory holding costs (Bougheas et 
al., 2009; Mateut et al., 2015). 
3.2.2. Independent variables
The main variable of interest are financial distress and financial constraints. Firstly, this study 
estimates the effect of financial distress on trade credit provisions excluding financial constraints 
in the estimation model. Then, the study estimates the effect of financial constraints on trade 
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credit provisions excluding financial distress in the estimation model. Finally, the estimation of 
both the effect of financial distress and financial constraints on trade credit provisions. 
3.2.2.1. Financial distress
This study uses the Zmijewski (1984) financial distress score as a proxy for financial distress 
(FDit). The Zmijewski (1984) distress score is computed using the index below. A higher 
Zmijewski’s score indicates a higher likelihood of bankruptcy.
 .   𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = ―4.336 ― [(4.513 ∗ (𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)] + [5.679 ∗ (𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)] +[0.004 ∗ (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡)]
All firms are rank according to their distress score for each year. Firms in the top thirty 
percentiles of the distress score in each year are considered financially distressed and a dummy 
variable 1 is assigned to such firms. The results of the estimates in this study are unaffected 
when alternative measures of financial distress are used in the estimation. For robustness test, 
this study uses the Asquith et al. (1994) measure of financial distress. A firm is classified as 
financial distress (FDit) if the interests cover, measured by the ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization to interest expense is less than 0.8 in any particular year or 
if the firm reported losses for three consecutive years. 
3.2.2.2. Financial constraints
The second variable of interest is the firm’s financial constraints. The literature is divided on the 
proxy that best captures financial constraints and as a result, empirical studies tend to employ a 
range of measures for robustness (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016). Existing proxies aim to 
infer financial constraints from firm’s statements about their funding situation or changes in 
investment plans, their actions (such as not paying a dividend), or their characteristics such as 
being young or small, having low leverage, or no credit rating). Aterido, Beck, and Iacovone 
(2013) argue that there is a need to distinguish between access to and use of formal financial 
services. While firms and individuals with access but no need for financial services are of less 
concern for policymakers, constrained access that translates into reduced use of formal financial 
services constitutes a challenge. Since the focus of this study is about firms funding situation or 
changes in investment plans due to liquidity condition this study uses dividend payout ratio as a 
measure of financial constraints (FCit).  This is consistent with Aterido, Beck, and Iacovone 
(2013) argument on the need to focus financial constraint measure on the use of fund rather than 
access to fund. This study assumes that dividend payout ratios gives a better indication on the 
firm’s use of funds. Consistent with Linck, Netter, and Shu (2013) all firms are rank according to 
their dividend payout ratios for each year. Firms in the bottom three deciles of dividend payout 
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ratios each year are considered financially constrained and a dummy variable 1 is assigned to 
such firms. 
3.2.3. Control variables
The nature of the firm’s assets might influence its financing policy. This study includes the ratio 
of accounts receivables to assets (ARit/ATi,t-1) in Model 1 and ratio of accounts payables to assets 
(APit/ATi,t-1) in Model 2, to test the maturity-matching hypothesis. The maturity-matching 
hypothesis states that the firm matches the maturity structure of their debt to the maturity 
structure of their assets (Ozkan, 2000). Firms might attempt to match their accounts receivables 
to accounts payables and vice versa. The ratio of inventory to total assets (INVit/ATi,1-t) is 
included in the control variables as a proxy for transaction cost arguments that firms with higher 
raw materials inventory borrow more from their suppliers, and that buyers use trade credits to 
bridge the period between purchase and payments, in order to reduce the transaction costs of 
paying bills. Also, in firms where inventories largely consist of raw materials, or where raw 
materials are slowly consumed in the production process, the collateral values of suppliers are 
higher. If this feature provides suppliers with financing advantage, firms, which find it difficult 
to raise bank debt will gladly, take up the offered trade credit (Huyghebaert, 2006). 
The  is a vector that includes other control variables that affect trade credit provisions as 𝑍𝑖𝑡
evidenced by extant literature. This study includes sales growth (SGROWit) defined as the ratio 
of the annual change in sales revenue to net sales revenue. Firms that experience a sharp increase 
or decrease in sales for exogenous reasons may experience a change in their trade credits. They 
may be perceived as a rapidly growing client by the suppliers and this might induce a positive 
bias in their incentives to offer more trade credit, or the opposite may be true in the case of steep 
declines in sales (Molina and Preve, 2012). Board size ln(BDSIZE) is included in the control 
variable and is defined as the natural logarithm of a number of directors on board. Larger board 
reduces information asymmetry (Chen and Jaggi, 2000), with the potential to bring more 
experience, knowledge and offer better advice (Dalton et al., 1999). Almeida and Campello 
(2007) argue that asset tangibility (TANGit) increases a firm’s ability to obtain external 
financing. Firms with more tangible assets obtain more external financing because such asset 
mitigates contractibility problems: tangibility increases the value that can be captured by 
creditors in default states. Asset tangibility also affects the credit status of the firm, as firms with 
very tangible assets may become unconstrained. Asset tangibility is measured as a ratio of 
Property, Plant and Equipment to total assets. This study also includes gross margin 
(GMARGINit) in the control variables, measured as the ratio of gross profit to sales. Consistent 
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with Petersen and Rajan (1997) the inclusion of gross margin tests whether firms with higher 
margins offer more trade credits. The ratio of a number of independent directors to a total 
number of directors on board (INDIRit) is included in the control variables. The role of 
independent directors includes traditional monitoring and advising on business finance (Xia et 
al., 2019). This study conjectures that firms with well-connected independent directors might be 
able to obtain finance from the financial market and would not have to rely on the use of trade 
credit, which is a costly source of finance. Appendix A presents a detailed definition of model 
variables.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive analysis
Panel A of Table I shows that the mean, median and standard deviation for account payables, 
accounts receivables, financial distress, financial constraints and the control variables. The 
results shows that the average ratio of accounts receivables to total assets is higher than the 
average ratio of accounts payables for total assets. 
Table I  
about here  
The results show that average of 13 percent of the FTSE 350 firm’s assets were financed by 
accounts payables while average of 18 percent of the FTSE 350 assets consists of accounts 
receivables. This results suggests that the FTSE 350 provides more trade credit to customers than 
they received from suppliers. The average financial distress firms is 0.30. This indicates that 
about 30 percent of the FTSE 350 firms are financially distressed when they are ranked by their 
score on the Zmijewski (1984) financial distress model. The average financial constrained is 
0.40. This indicates that about 40 percent of the FTSE 350 firms are financially constrained 
when ranked by their dividend payout ratios. 
Panel B of Table I average ratio of accounts payables to total assets is higher for bottom fifty 
percentiles than the upper fifty percentiles of FTSE 350 firms when ranked by total assets. This 
result indicates that smaller firms used more of trade credit to finance their assets than big firms. 
The F statistic for the analysis of variance indicates that there is a significant difference in the 
proportion of total assets financed with trade credits by the firms each assets percentile 
categories. On the other hand, average ratio of accounts payables to total assets is lower for 
bottom fifty percentiles than the upper fifty percentiles of FTSE 350 firms when ranked by 
firm’s age. This result indicates that younger firms get less trade credit from suppliers. Since 
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firm’s age indicates the length of relationship with suppliers, the results indicates that firms that 
have long relationship with their suppliers gets more trade credits from those suppliers. The F 
statistic for the analysis of variance indicates that there is a significant difference in the 
proportion of total assets financed with trade credits by the firms each age percentile categories.
Table II presents the correlation matrix, and shows that financial distress (FD) firms receives less 
trade credit from suppliers. The direction of relationship in the correlation matrix is not in line 
with the predictions in this study. This might be due to the ommissions of  the ratio of accounts 
receivables to assets in the estimation of the correlation coefficients. The correlation matrix also 
shows that financial constraint (FC) firms receice less trade credit from suppliers which is in line 
with the prediction in this study. Financial distress firms reduced credit sales to their customers, 
which is also in line with the prediction in this study. Financial constraints firms reduced credit 
sales to customers which is not in line with the prediction in this study. This might be due to the 
omission of the ratio of accounts payables to assets in the estimation of the correlation 
coefficients. All the variables have a VIF less than 10, which confirms that there is no 
multicollinearity problem in the sample.
Table II  
about here  
4.2.1 Financial distress, financial constraints, and accounts payables
Table III presents the OLS, Two-way Random effects and Two-step System GMM estimation of 
the effects of financial distress and financial constraints on accounts payables. The effect of 
financial distress and financial constraint on accounts payables were first estimated 
independently, then the joint effect of both financial distress and financial constraints on 
accounts payables were estimated. In the OLS estimation, the Durbin-Watson test for all the 
OLS estimates shows that autocorrelation is not a problem since the Durbin-Watson statistics are 
greater than or about 1.50. All the main variables retained their direction and significance in the 
two-way random effects estimates. Financial distress has a significant positive effect on accounts 
payables while financial constraints has a significant negative effect on accounts payables in all 
the estmation techinques. The significant positive effect of financial distress on accounts 
payables indicates that financial distressed  firms get more trade credits from suppliers. Based on 
this result, this study accepts the first hypothesis, that is, H1a: There is a significant positive 
relationship between financial distress and trade payables in the UK FTSE 350 firms. The 
significant positive effect of financial distress on accounts payables also supports Meltzer (1960) 
Page 13 of 27 Asian Review of Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Asian Review of Accounting
Page | 14 
argument that suppliers pass funds via trade credits to less liquid buyers, which helps to assist 
weaker trading partners. The results also supports Wilner (2000) argument that a firm in distress 
can take advantage of a creditor if it generates a large percentage of the creditor’s profit. Trade 
creditor desiring to maintain an enduring product-market relationship grant more concessions to 
a customer in financing distress, while the debtors anticipate larger renegotiation concessions, 
and agrees to pay a higher interest rate to the trade creditor. 
Table III  
about here  
The result in Table III shows a significant negative coeffiecients for the relationship between 
financial constraints and accounts payables. Based on this result, this study accepts the second 
hypothesis, that is, H1b: There is a significant negative relationship between financial constraints 
and trade payables in the UK FTSE 350 firms. It can be argued that financial constraints firms 
are not creditworthy, hence they do not have access to funds in the financial market, and trade 
partners reduce the supply of credit to customers that are not creditworthy. The significant 
negative results indicate that trading partners may be concern about the creditworthiness of their 
customers who do not have access to the finance market. The  result do not support the financial 
assistance argument of trade credit which suggests that financially strong firms should extend 
more trade credits to trading partners that face more financial constraints owing to poor access to 
bank loans and the financial market.
The control variable AR shows a significant positive relationship with AP. This is consistent 
with the maturity-matching hypothesis which suggests that firm matches the maturity structure 
of their debt to the maturity structure of their assets (Ozkan, 2000). TANG shows a significant 
positive coefficient. This indicates that trade suppliers are willing to extend more trade credit to 
firms that are able to provide more collaterals to support their demand for finance in the financial 
markets. INV show a significat positive coefficients. This result is consistent with the 
explanation that trade credit can be issued against inventory (the matching hypothesis), since 
inventory can be easily liquidated. 
In addition to the endogeneity bias due to omitted unobservable company characteristics, reverse 
causality could also be a potential source of endogeneity. As a robustness test, this study 
estimates a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) based on Arellano and Bond 
(1991). The system GMM has been found to be more efficient, compared to the difference GMM 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998), because system GMM performs well in the presence of 
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heteroskedasticity with a small time-series dimension.  Rather than predict the lagged dependent 
variable based solely on its previous value. The estimate requires firms to have data for at least 
five consecutive years, which is a necessary condition to have a sufficient number of periods to 
be able to test for the second-order serial correlation, this left unbalanced panel observations.
The quality of the GMM estimates depends on the validity of the matrix of instruments and on 
the assumption that the error term does not exhibit autocorrelation. Given that the equation has 
been formulated in first differences, the residuals are suppose to be correlated to the order 1 but 
not to order 2. The results of the System GMM estimates in Table III shows that the 
autoregressive estimates AR(m) is significant in lag one year but not in a lag to the second year, 
this result indicates that the system GMM is well-fitted. The Sargan test is a test of the validity of 
the instrument used in the model. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are not valid; 
that is, they are correlated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are not correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. The estimated probability values of the Sargan test are 
greater than 0.05. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that the moment's conditions 
conferred by the instrumental variable (lagged dependent variables) used in the model are not 
valid. This result suggests that the model as estimated is not misspecified.
4.2.2 Financial distress, financial constraints, and accounts receivable
Table IV presents the OLS, the Two-way Random effects and two step System GMM estimation 
of the effects of financial distress and financial constraints on accounts receivables. The effect of 
financial distress and financial constraint on accounts payables were first estimated 
independently, then the effect joint effect of both financial distress and financial constraints on 
accounts payables were estimated. The Durbin-Watson test for all the OLS estimates shows that 
autocorrelation is not a problem since the Durbin-Watson statistics are greater than 1.50. All the 
main variables retained their direction and significance in the two-way random effects estimates. 
Financial distress (FD) has a significant negative effect on accounts receivables while financial 
constraints has a significant positive effect on accounts receivables in all the estmation 
techinques. The significant negative effect of financial distress on accounts receivables indicates 
that financial distressed  firms reduced credits sales to customers. Based on this result, this study 
accepts the third hypothesis, that is, H2a: There is a significant negative relationship between 
financial distress and trade receivables in the UK FTSE 350 firms. This result indicates that 
financially troubled firms reduce the supply of trade credits to their customers. The result is 
consistent with Opler and Titman (1994) who suggests that financial distress firms lose 
customers, valuable suppliers, employees and significant market share to their healthy 
counterparts. The result is also consistent with Molina and Preve (2009) argue that  a negative 
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effect of financial distress on trade receivables could be due to the urgent cash needs of 
financially distressed firms. Such a negative relationship could also arise if the distressed firm 
sells its trade receivables to a factoring company instead of directly reducing its trade 
receivables.
Table IV also show that for financial constraints (FC) have significant positive effects on 
accounts receivables. Based on this result, this study accepts the fourth hypothesis, that is, H2b: 
There is a significant positive relationship between financial constraints and trade receivables in 
the UK FTSE 350 firms. This result supports the argument in Meltzer (1960) who argues that 
trade credit act as a substitute for financial credit during periods of tight monetary policy, leading 
to an increase in trade credit provisions. The result also indicates that financially constrained 
firms may use trade credit as collateral for loans from financial institutions, to ease the supplier-
side finance requirements to buy input resources (Biais and Gollier, 1997). 
Table IV  
about here  
In addition,  the result supports the argument that sellers can better enforce debts contracts 
because when the buyer defaults on credits, the seller can seize the goods that they sold on credit 
and sell them to other customers (Mian and Smith, 1992). The control variable AP shows a 
significant positive relationship with AR in all the estimations. This result is consistent with the 
maturity-matching hypothesis, which suggests that firm matches the maturity structure of their 
debt to the maturity structure of their assets (Ozkan, 2000). TANG shows a significant negative 
coefficient and indicates that since FTSE350 firms are successful and growing firms, refrain 
from offering trade credits to custmers because they can obtain the much-needed finance from 
other sources as they increase investment in tangible fixed assets. INV has a significant negative 
effect on accounts receivable, and indicates that inventories serve as a buffer for internal finance, 
and a substitutes for accounts receivable (Carpenter et al., 1994; Kim and Choi, 2001), leading to 
a decrease in trade receivables. 
To further reduce endogeneity concerns, this study performs several complementary analysis by 
firm’s age and size. Petersen and Rajan (1994) argue that it is possible for lenders to obtain 
sufficient information on firm’s ability to service debt-like claims by observing its past 
interactions with other fixed claims holders like employees or prior creditors. In such case, they 
argue that the age of the firm could determine the lender’s cost and availability of funds. They 
further argue that small firms are unlikely to be monitored by rating agencies or the financial 
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press. As a result, there may be large information asymmetries between small firms and potential 
public investors. Similarly, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) argue that size and age are the most 
important charactristics of the firm that determines a firm’s ability to raise fund in the public 
capital market. 
In additional analysis which are not reported, this study ranks firms by size and age for each 
year. Firms in the lower 25th percentile of total assets in each year are coded small firms and a 
dummy variable 1 is assigned to firms in the category. Firms in the lower 25th percentile of age 
in each year are coded young firms and a dummy variable 1 is assigned to firms in the category.  
This study interacts the young firms dummy variable with financial distress variable and the 
small firm dummy variable with financial contraints variable. Both of these variables are used in 
the regression estimation. The result shows a significant positive impact of the interaction of 
young firms with financial distress on accounts payables, and a significant negative impact of the 
interaction of small firms and financial constraints on accounts payables. Conversely, the results 
show a significant negative impact of the interaction of young firms with financial distress on 
accounts receivables, and a significant positive impact of the interaction of small firms and 
financial constraints on accounts receivables.
The significant positive impact of the interaction of young firm and financial distress on 
accounts payables suggests that financial distress is prevalent among young firms, and that 
young firms that are financially  distressed pass on the adverse effect of their distress by 
defaulting on their suppliers, leading to an increase in trade payables (Boissay and Gropp, 2007). 
Similarly, the significant positive negative impact of the interaction of small firms and financial 
constraints suggests that financial constraints are prevailent among small firms and that since 
small firms are unlikely to be monitored by rating agencies or the financial press, there may be 
large information asymmetries between these firms and potential public investors (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994). Therefore, suppliers also reduce trade credit to small firms that are financially 
constrained. Furthermore, this study uses the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) Size-Age index which a 
commonly used to proxy for finanancial constraints. For each year, firms are ranked by their 
score on the size-age index. A dummy variable 1 is assigned to firms in the bottom 3 deciles of 
the Size-Age index. The result is unaffected by the use of this alternative proxy for financial 
constraints. 
5. Implications and conclusions
This study evaluates the effects of financial distress and financial constraints on accounts 
payables and accounts receivables in FTSE 350 listed firms. The results show that financially 
distressed have a significant positive effect on accounts payables. This result suggests that trade 
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creditor desiring to maintain an enduring product-market relationship grant more concessions to 
a customer in financing distress, while the debtors anticipate larger renegotiation concessions, 
and agrees to pay a higher interest rate to the trade creditor (Wilner, 2000). The result further 
indicates that financial distress firms are willing to pay the higher interest rate on trade credit 
because associated renegotiations are more likely. On the other hand, the result shows a 
significant negative relationship between financial distress and accounts receivables. This result 
suggests that the urgent cash needs of financially distressed firms, and the possibility of thee 
distressed firm selling its trade receivables to a factoring company lead to a reduced level of 
trade receivables (Molina and Preve, 2009). The result also suggests that  financial distress firms 
lose customers, valuable suppliers, employees and significant market share to their healthy 
counterparts leading to a reduced level of accunts receivables (Opler and Titman, 1994). 
Additional analysis indicates that financial distress is prevalent among young firms, and that 
young firms that are financially  distressed pass on the adverse effect of their distress by 
defaulting on their suppliers, leading to an increase in trade payables (Boissay and Gropp, 2007). 
Financial constraints have a significant negative effects on accounts payables, which indicates 
that the amount of trade credit that sellers provide to the buyer is an increasing function of the 
buyer’s creditworthiness (Frank and Maksimovic, 2004). Since financial constrained firms are 
likely to have a low credit worthy status in the financial market, suppliers tend to reduce the 
supply of trade credits to them. This result implies that there is an overall reduction in credit 
received from both the financial markets and trade customers by financial constrained firm, 
probably due to concern for their creditworthiness. Suppliers like the financial market are 
unwilling to take the risk of extending credits to financially constrained firms. On the other hand, 
financial constraints have a significant positive effect on accounts receivables, suggesting that 
firm facing external financing constraints or external capital rationing increase supply of trade 
credit in anticipation of future cash flow to finance the profitable projects. Financial constrained 
firms may use trade credit as collateral for loans from financial institutions, to ease the supplier-
side finance requirements to buy input resources (Biais and Gollier, 1997), leading to an increase 
in the level of trade receivables. Additional analysis indicates that financial constraints are 
prevailent among small firms and since there may be large information asymmetries between 
small firms and potential public suppliers reduce trade credit to small firms that are financially 
constrained.
The results in this study  imply that suppliers provide liquidity insurance to theor clients when 
they are financially distressed, and underscore their role as liquidity providers of last resort 
(Wilner, 2000; Cunat, 2007). The results in this study also imply that firms that experience 
Page 18 of 27Asian Review of Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Asian Review of Accounting
Page | 19 
financial trouble reduce trade credit provisions to their customers, or that they sell their trade 
credits to a factoring company. These results are consistent with the redistribution view of trade 
credit provision (Meltzer, 1960; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Nilsen, 2002). On the other hand, 
firms suppliers are concerned with credit worthiness of firms that finds it difficult to raise funds 
from the financial markets and thefore also reduce supply of trade credit to firms that are 
financial constrained. While firms that are financial constrained increase trade credit to their 
customers in anticipation of a cash flow from customers that coulde help alleviate their financial 
constraint. The findings in this study highlights the importance of non-financial firms in offering 
substitute credit in times of financial distress and in selling more on credit when financially 
constrained. The results points suggests that policies aimed at enhancing trade credit could prove 
more effective to foster economic growth. 
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Appendix A variable labels and definitions
Dependent variables
AP Ratio of Accounts Payables to Total Assets (APit/TAi,t-1)
AR Ratio of Accounts Receivable to Total Assets (ARit/TAi,t-1)
Independent variables
FDit  Zmijewski’s (1984) distress score for financial distress
.   𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = ―4.336 ― [(4.513 ∗ (𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)] + [5.679 ∗ (𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)] +[0.004 ∗ (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡)]
All firms are rank according to their distress score for each year. Firms in the top 
thirty percentiles of the distress score in each year are considered financially 
distressed and a dummy variable 1 is assigned to such firms.
FCit Dummy variable 1 if a firm dividend payout ratio ranks in the bottom three 
deciles of dividend payout ratios for sample FTSE350 firms in each year.
Control variables
ARit Ratio of accounts receivables to assets (ARit/TAi,t-1) in Model 1 
APit Ratio of accounts payables to assets (APit/TAi,t-1) in Model 2
INVit Ratio of inventory to total assets (INVit/TAi,1-t)
SGROWit  Ratio of the annual change in sales revenue to net sales revenue ((SALESt – 
SALESi,t-1)/SALES i,t-1)
BDSIZEit natural logarithm of number of directors on board ln(BDSIZE)
TANGit Asset Tangibility, ratio of Property, Plant and Equipment to total assets 
(PPEit/TA i,t-1)
GMARGINit Gross margin, ratio of gross profit to sales [(REVit - COGSit)/REVit]
INDIRit Ratio of number of independent directors to total number of directors on board.
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Effects of financial distress and financing constraints on trade credit provisions 
Table I. 
Descriptive statistics
Panel A. 
Label N Median Mean Std Dev  
AP 1776 0.06 0.13 0.52
AR 1666 0.08 0.18 0.86
FD 1960 0.00 0.30 0.46
FC 1978 0.00 0.40 0.49
TANG 2091 0.22 0.35 0.90
INV 1663 0.06 0.15 0.86
GMARGIN 1571 0.38 0.44 0.27
SGROW 2127 5.26 9.09 31.38
BDSIZE 2169 2.20 2.10 0.42
INDIR 2227 0.57 0.49 0.27  
Panel B.
Total Assets 
Percentile 
Range 
Mean 
AP
Mean 
AR
Firm's Age 
Percentile 
Range
Mean AP Mean 
AR
1-10 0.16 0.22 1-10 0.14 0.18
10-25 0.17 0.3 10-25 0.08 0.1
25-50 0.14 0.21 25-50 0.1 0.2
50-75 0.08 0.1 50-75 0.09 0.12
75-90 0.09 0.09 75-90 0.15 0.17
90-100 0.07 0.06 90-100 0.19 0.31
ANOVA F 4.6 4.73 2.51 1.82
Pr > F 0.0004 0.0003  0.0284 0.106
Notes: This table reports the mean, median, and standard deviations of variables used in this study for the entire sample it 
also shows the mean values of accounts payables and accounts receivables for total assets percentile range and firm’s age 
percentile range. AP is the ratio of Accounts Payables to Total Assets (APit/TAi,t-1); AR is the ratio of Accounts Receivable 
to Total Assets (ARit/TAi,t-1);  FDit is a measure of financial distress computed with the Zmijewski’s (1984) financial 
condition index: ; All firms are rank according to 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = ―4.336 ― [(4.513 ∗ (𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)] + [5.679 ∗ (𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)] +[0.004 ∗ (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡)]
their distress score for each year. Firms in the top thirty percentiles of the distress score in each year are considered 
financially distressed and a dummy variable 1 is assigned to such firms.  FCit is the measure of financial constraints 
and it is a dummy variable 1 if a firm dividend payout ratio ranks in the bottom three deciles of dividend payout 
ratios for sample FTSE350 firms in each year; TANGit Asset Tangibility, ratio of Property, Plant and Equipment to total 
assets (PPEit/TA i,t-1); INVit Ratio of inventory to total assets (INVit/TAi,1-t); GMARGINit Gross margin, ratio of gross 
profit to sales [(REVit - COGSit)/REVit]; SGROWit Ratio of the annual change in sales revenue to net sales revenue 
((SALESt – SALESi,t-1)/SALES i,t-1); BDSIZEit natural logarithm of number of directors on board ln(BDSIZE);  INDIRi 
Ratio of number of independent directors to total number of directors on board. 
Notes: This table reports the mean, median, and standard deviations of variables used in this study for the entire 
sample it shows the mean values of accounts payables and accounts receivables for total assets percentile range and 
firm’s age percentile range. AP is the ratio of Accounts Payables to Total Assets (APit/TAi,t-1); AR is the ratio of 
Accounts Receivable to Total Assets (ARit/TAi,t-1);  FDit is a measure of financial distress computed with the 
Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index: 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = ―4.336 ― [(4.513 ∗ (𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)] + [5.679 ∗ (𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)] +[0.004 ∗
; All firms are rank according to their distress score for each year. Firms in the top thirty percentiles of the (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡)]
distress score in each year are considered financially distressed and a dummy variable 1 is assign to such firms.  
FCit is the measure of financial constraint and it is a dummy variable 1 if a firm’s dividend payout ratio ranks in the 
bottom three deciles of dividend payout ratios for the sample FTSE350 firms in each year. TANGit Asset 
Tangibility, ratio of Property, Plant and Equipment to total assets (PPEit/TA i,t-1); INVit Ratio of inventory to total 
assets (INVit/TAi,1-t); GMARGINit Gross margin, ratio of gross profit to sales [(REVit - COGSit)/REVit]; SGROWit 
Ratio of the annual change in sales revenue to net sales revenue ((SALESt – SALESi,t-1)/SALES i,t-1); BDSIZEit 
natural logarithm of number of directors on board ln(BDSIZE);  INDIRi Ratio of number of independent directors 
to total number of directors on board. 
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Table II
Spearman Correlation Coefficients
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 VIF 
(AP)
VIF 
(AR)
1 AP
2 AR 0.52***
3 FD -
0.14***
-
0.09***
1.03 1.03
4 FC -
0.12***
-
0.13***
0.07*** 1.04 1.04
5 TANG -
0.19***
-
0.18***
0.20*** 0.05** 1.01 1.03
6 INV 0.36*** 0.15*** -
0.19***
0.03 0 1.46 2.97
7 GMARGI
N
-
0.26***
-0.06** 0.04 -0.04* -0.02 -
0.25***
1.04 1.04
8 SGROW 0.06*** 0.01 -
0.10***
0.04** -
0.10***
0.07*** 0.04* 1.03 1.03
9 BDSIZE -
0.08***
-0.01 0.04** -0.03* 0.04* -
0.09***
0.09**
*
-
0.09***
1.02 1.02
1
0
INDIR 0.06*** 0.03 -0.02 -
0.07***
0.03* 0.02 -
0.06**
-
0.10***
0.05*
*
1.03 1.03
Notes: *Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% l vel. This table reports the Spearman correlation coefficients and the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) of variables used in this study. AP is the ratio of Accounts Payables to Total Assets (APit/TAi,t-1); AR is the 
ratio of Accounts Receivable to Total Assets (ARit/TAi,t-1);  FDit is a measure of financial distress computed with the 
Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition ndex: 𝑭𝑫𝒊𝒕 = ―𝟒.𝟑𝟑𝟔 ― [(𝟒.𝟓𝟏𝟑 ∗ (𝑵𝑰𝒊𝒕𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕)] + [𝟓.𝟔𝟕𝟗 ∗ (𝑻𝑫𝒊𝒕𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕)] +[𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟒 ∗ (𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒕𝑪𝑳𝒊𝒕)]
; All firms are rank according to their distress score for each year. Firms in the top thirty percentiles of the distress score 
in each year are considered financially distressed and a dummy variable 1 is assign to such firms.  FCit is the measure of 
financial constraints. FC is a dummy variable 1 if a firm’s dividend payout ratio ranks in the bottom three deciles of 
dividend payout ratios for sample FTSE350 firms in each year. TANGit Asset Tangibility is the ratio of Property, Plant 
and Equipment to total assets (PPEit/TA i,t-1). INVit Ratio of inventory to total assets (INVit/TAi,1-t); GMARGINit Gross 
margin, ratio of gross profit to sales [(REVit - COGSit)/REVit]; SGROWit Ratio of the annual change in sales revenue to 
net sales revenue ((SALESt – SALESi,t-1)/SALES i,t-1); BDSIZEit natural logarithm of number of directors on board 
ln(BDSIZE);  INDIRi Ratio of number of independent directors to total number of directors on board. 
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Table III
Financial distress, financial constraints, and accounts payables
Dep. Var. AP/ATi,t-1
 OLS Two-way RE Two-step System GMM
  FD  FC FD & FC  FD  FC FD & FC  FD  FC FD & FC
Intercept  -0.0040  0.0180 0.0170 0.0000 0.0170 0.0140
 (-0.17)  (0.7) (0.65) (0.01) (0.52) (0.42)
FD  0.042*** 0.048*** 0.028**
*
0.033*** 0.002**
*
0.002***
(4.51) (5.01) (2.7) (3.08) (12.7) (5.32)
FC  -0.03*** -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.006*** -0.006***
 (-3.64) (-4.1) (-2.65) (-2.81) (-31.2) (-27.3)
AR 0.551*** 0.554*** 0.552*** 0.547**
*
0.549*** 0.548*** 0.432**
*
0.455*** 0.438***
(80.8) (80.3) (80.8) (84.3) (83.8) (83.9) (82.2) (122.) (121.)
TANG 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.031**
*
0.031*** 0.030*** 0.075**
*
0.081*** 0.071***
(7.75) (7.94) (7.65) (8.7) (8.64) (8.53) (129.) (80.0) (33.4)
INV 0.281*** 0.279*** 0.281*** 0.285**
*
0.284*** 0.284*** 0.340**
*
0.330*** 0.337***
(57.0) (56.4) (57) (62.2) (61.3) (61.5) (155.) (211.) (220.)
GMARGIN -0.0000 0.0010 -0.0050 0.0250 0.0270 0.0200 -0.11*** -0.112*** -0.114***
(-0.04) (0.1) (-0.36) (1.22) (1.3) (0.96) (-93.4) (-92.3) (-56.5)
SGROW -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(-1.38) (-1.34) (-1.05) (-0.99) (-0.91) (-0.81) (.) (.) (.)
BDSIZE -0.0040 -0.0030 -0.0060 -0.0060 -0.0060 -0.0070 -0.01*** -0.007*** -0.010***
(-0.41) (-0.35) (-0.64) (-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.53) (-24.6) (-17.2) (-15.1)
INDIR -0.0070 -0.0130 -0.0120 -0.0250 -0.0280 -0.0270 -0.02*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(-0.41) (-0.69) (-0.64) (-1.31) (-1.41) (-1.35) (-29.4) (-32.4) (-20.0)
Observations 1201 1192 1180
Cross Sections 219 221 215 219 221 221
Time Series 8 8 8 8 8 8
MSE 0.14109 0.14312 0.14114 0.014 0.015 0.015
R-Square 0.9483 0.9473 0.9492 0.956 0.955 0.956
Adj R-Sq 0.9479 0.947 0.9488
Fvalue 2732.0**
*
2659.1**
*
2427.87**
*
D-W 1.492*** 1.501*** 1.515***
Autocorrelatio
n
0.254 0.249 0.243
VC Cross Sect. 0.005 0.005 0.005
VC Time 
Series
0 0 0
VC Error 0.015 0.015 0.015
Hausman Test 13.66* 11.26 14.06
AR(m) Test
Lag 1 -2.13** -2.28** -2.13**
Lag 2 1.21 1.13 1.09
Sargan Test       155.45 154.53 152.06
Notes: *Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
***Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. This table reports the effects of the estimation of financial 
distress (FD) and financial constraints (FC) on Accounts Payables (AP). AP is the ratio of Accounts Payables to 
Total Assets (APit/TAi,t-1); AR Ratio of Accounts Receivable to Total Assets (ARit/TAi,t-1);  FDit is a measure of 
financial distress computed with the Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index: 𝑭𝑫𝒊𝒕 = ―𝟒.𝟑𝟑𝟔 ― [
; In order to determine distress firms, the distress score are (𝟒.𝟓𝟏𝟑 ∗ (𝑵𝑰𝒊𝒕𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕)] + [𝟓.𝟔𝟕𝟗 ∗ (𝑻𝑫𝒊𝒕𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕)] +[𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟒 ∗ (𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒕𝑪𝑳𝒊𝒕)]
rank for each firm for each year. Firms in the top thirty percentiles of the distress score in each year are considered 
financially distressed and a dummy variable 1 is assigned to such firms.  FCit is the measure of financial constraints. 
FC is a dummy variable 1 if a firm’s dividend payout ratio ranks in the bottom three deciles of dividend payout 
ratios for sample FTSE350 firms in each year. TANGit Asset Tangibility is the ratio of Property, Plant and 
Equipment to total assets (PPEit/TA i,t-1). INVit Ratio of inventory to total assets (INVit/TAi,1-t); GMARGINit Gross 
margin, ratio of gross profit to sales [(REVit - COGSit)/REVit]; SGROWit Ratio of the annual change in sales revenue 
to net sales revenue ((SALESt – SALESi,t-1)/SALES i,t-1); BDSIZEit natural logarithm of number of directors on board 
ln(BDSIZE);  INDIRi Ratio of number of independent directors to total number of directors on board. 
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Table IV
Financial distress, financial constraints, and accounts receivables
Dep. Var. AR/ATi,t-1
 OLS Two-way RE Two-step System GMM
  FD  FC FD & FC  FD  FC FD & FC  FD  FC FD & FC
Intercept 0.0020 -0.0370 -0.0350 -0.0110 -0.0470 -0.0400
(0.05) (-0.84) (-0.8) (-0.2) (-0.83) (-0.72)
FD -0.063*** -0.072*** -0.044** -0.052*** -0.01*** -0.014***
(-4.06) (-4.56) (-2.5) (-2.94) (-20.3) (-28.2)
FC 0.051*** 0.058*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.010*** 0.005***
(3.6) (4.05) (3.12) (3.3) (23.6) (20.5)
AP 1.532*** 1.523*** 1.534*** 1.56*** 1.560*** 1.562*** 0.549*** 0.614*** 0.565***
(80.8) (80.3) (80.8) (84.3) (83.8) (83.8) (129.) (105.) (88.0)
TANG -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.04*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.14*** -0.161*** -0.117***
(-6.38) (-6.52) (-6.31) (-7.24) (-7.28) (-7.08) (-41.5) (-44.7) (-31.4)
INV -0.369*** -0.364*** -0.370*** -0.39*** -0.384*** -0.386*** 0.132*** 0.098*** 0.123***
(-31.5) (-31.2) (-31.5) (-34.0) (-33.7) (-33.7) (59.5) (30.6) (36.3)
GMARGIN 0.0160 0.0140 0.0240 -0.0240 -0.0190 -0.0130 -0.21*** -0.171*** -0.178***
(0.62) (0.52) (0.91) (-0.7) (-0.56) (-0.39) (-60.6) (-44.6) (-93.0)
SGROW 0.000* 0.000* 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(1.82) (1.79) (1.56) (1.56) (1.5) (1.4) (66.5) (35.0) (39.3)
BDSIZE 0.0150 0.0150 0.0200 0.0210 0.0220 0.0240 -0.01*** -0.001** -0.004***
(0.87) (0.87) (1.13) (0.94) (0.94) (1.04) (-24.2) (-2.39) (-7.92)
INDIR 0.0000 0.0080 0.0070 0.0270 0.0320 0.0300 -0.02*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.03) (0.27) (0.24) (0.84) (0.96) (0.91) (-14.6) (-19.3) (-12.1)
Observations 1201 1192 1180
Cross Sections 219 215 215 219 215 215
Time Series 8 8 8 8 8 8
MSE 0.23508 0.23721 0.23525 0.042 0.043 0.043
R-Square 0.894 0.893 0.8957 0.904 0.904 0.905
Adj R-Sq 0.8933 0.8922 0.8949
Fvalue 1256.23*** 1233.59*** 1116.57***
D-W 1.577*** 1.587*** 1.591***
Autocorrelation 0.212 0.206 0.205
VC Cross Sect. 0.014 0.013 0.013
VC Time 
Series
0 0 0
VC Error 0.043 0.044 0.044
Hausman Test 15.08* 9.77 13.82
AR(m) Test
Lag 1 -2.65*** -2.51** -2.68***
Lag 2 0.61 0.75 0.51
Sargan Test       154.87 149.85 153.26
Notes: This table reports the mean, median, and standard deviations of variables used in this study for the entire sample it 
also shows the mean values of accounts payables and accounts receivables for total assets percentile range and firm’s age 
percentile range. AP is the ratio of Accounts Payables to Total Assets (APit/TAi,t-1); AR is the ratio of Accounts Receivable 
to Total Assets (ARit/TAi,t-1);  FDit is a measure of financial distress computed with the Zmijewski’s (1984) financial 
condition index: ; All firms are rank according to 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 = ―4.336 ― [(4.513 ∗ (𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)] + [5.679 ∗ (𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡)] +[0.004 ∗ (𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡)]
their distress score for each year. Firms in the top thirty percentiles of the distress score in each year are considered 
financially distressed and a dummy variable 1 is assigned to such firms.  FCit is the measure of financial constraints 
and it is a dummy variable 1 if a firm dividend payout ratio ranks in the bottom three deciles of dividend payout 
ratios for sample FTSE350 firms in each year; TANGit Asset Tangibility, ratio of Property, Plant and Equipment to total 
assets (PPEit/TA i,t-1); INVit Ratio of inventory to total assets (INVit/TAi,1-t); GMARGINit Gross margin, ratio of gross 
profit to sales [(REVit - COGSit)/REVit]; SGROWit Ratio of the annual change in sales revenue to net sales revenue 
((SALESt – SALESi,t-1)/SALES i,t-1); BDSIZEit natural logarithm of number of directors on board ln(BDSIZE);  INDIRi 
Ratio of number of independent directors to total number of directors on board. 
Notes: *Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. **Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Denotes 
statistical significance at the 1% level. This table reports the effects of the estimation of financial distress (FD) and 
financial constraints (FC) on Accounts Receivables (AR). AP is the ratio of Accounts Payables to Total Assets 
(APit/TAi,t-1); AR Ratio of Accounts Receivable to Total Assets (ARit/TAi,t-1);  FDit is a measure of financial distress 
computed with the Zmijewski’s (1984) financial condition index: 𝑭𝑫𝒊𝒕 = ―𝟒.𝟑𝟑𝟔 ― [(𝟒.𝟓𝟏𝟑 ∗ (𝑵𝑰𝒊𝒕𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕)] +
; In order to determine distress firms, the distress score are rank for each firm for each [𝟓.𝟔𝟕𝟗 ∗ (𝑻𝑫𝒊𝒕𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕)] +[𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟒 ∗ (𝑪𝑨𝒊𝒕𝑪𝑳𝒊𝒕)]
year. Firms in the top thirty percentiles of the distress score in each year are considered financially distressed and a 
dummy variable 1 is assign to such firms.  FCit is the measure of financial constraints. FC is a dummy variable 1 if a 
firm’s dividend payout ratio ranks in the bottom three deciles of dividend payout ratios for sample FTSE350 firms in 
each year. TANGit Asset Tangibility is the ratio of Property, Plant and Equipment to total assets (PPEit/TA i,t-1). INVit 
Ratio of inventory to total assets (INVit/TAi,1-t); GMARGINit Gross margin, ratio of gross profit to sales [(REVit - 
COGSit)/REVit]; SGROWit Ratio of the annual change in sales revenue to net sales revenue ((SALESt – SALESi,t-
1)/SALES i,t-1); BDSIZEit natural logarithm of number of directors on board ln(BDSIZE);  INDIRi Ratio of number of 
independent directors to total number of directors on board. 
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